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NOTES
BANKRUPTCY-EFFECT TO BE GIVEN TO JUDGMENT OF STATE

COURTs-The "full faith and credit" clause of the Constitution' does
not apply to the judgments of a state court when pleaded in a suit
before a federal court. But by Act of I8o4 2 Congress requires
"every court within the United States" to give such faith and credit
to the records and judicial proceedings of any state, when proved
in the manner specified in the act, "as they have by law or usage in
the courts of the state from which they are taken." This act, unlike
that forbidding the federal courts to enjoin proceedings in a state
court, 3 does not specifically exempt from its provisions the federal
courts of bankruptcy.
To what extent, then, is a court of bankruptcy bound to recognize, as conclusive, the judgments of a state court,--or of an inferior
' Article
St.IV,
U. §i.
S., §9o5.
'Rev. St. U. S., §720 (U. S. Comp. St., 1901, p.
2 Rev.

581).
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federal court when administering state law in cases of diverse citizenship? Must it receive proof of such judgment as conclusive of
the judgment creditor's right to participate in the distribution of
the bankrupt's estate? And in matters of discharge, must it accept
the judgment of the state court as to the bona fides or mala fides
of the bankrupt's acts? It must be remembered that a district court,
when sitting in bankruptcy, although of defined statutory powers,'
is exercising a distinct jurisdiction and in doing so is essentially a
court of equity.5 Its purpose is to execute its powers in accordance
with the spirit rather than with the mere letter of the Bankruptcy
Act.' By the adjudication in bankruptcy, title to the debtor's estate
is vested in the trustee; after adjudication, the bankrupt's interest
in his estate is concluded, except as to any surplus. The primary
and fundamental duty of the bankruptcy court is to supervise the
preservation of the estate for, and the ultimate distribution thereof
among, the honest, bona fide creditors of the bankrupt.'
Accordingly the determination of who are such creditors is a
most important and basic duty. Under the Bankruptcy Act," this
duty belongs to the courts of bankruptcy. Is therefore a judgment
of a state court that the bankrupt was indebted in a stated amount
to a creditor, to be regarded as res judicata in the court of bankruptcy when the allowance of claims comes before it? It seems that
in the majority of cases the affirmative view has been adopted. 9
Usually without discussion, they maintain that such a judgment,
if regular upon its face, is not open to collateral attack by the parties
thereto or their privies, nor by third parties except on the ground

of want of jurisdiction in the court rendering the judgment or of
fraud or collusion in securing the judgment. The only remedy
against it is by appeal to the proper state tribunal. 10 But it is submitted that it is difficult to see how the parties in interest after
adjudication-the trustee or the bona fide creditors-not being parties to the record, would be entitled to prosecute an appeal from a
judgment entered some time prior to the adjudication.
1U. S. Bankrupt Law, Act of July i, i898, 30 St. at L. 544, as amended
Feb. 5, 1903, 32 Stat. at L. 797; June 15, 19o6, 34 Stat. at L. 367, and June 25,
1910, 36 Stat. at L. 838.
.
Collier, Bankruptcy, §2a;Fowler v. Dillen, Fed. Cas. 5oo (1875); In
re
Norris, Fed. Cas. 1O, 304 (1870) ; Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U. S. i5O,
524 (1899); Mason v. Wolkowick, I5o Fed. 699 (19o6).
'In re Kane, 127 Fed. 552 (1904).
T
Supra, n. 4.
'§2, cl. 2.
SHandlon v. Walker, 200 Fed. 566 (C. C. A., 8th Cir., 1912); In re Ulfelder Co., 98 Fed. 4o9 -(1899) ; Peters v. U. S. ex rel. Kelley, 177 Fed. 885
(C. C. A., 7th Cir., igio), but see dissent of Grosscup, J.; In re Munro, 195

Fed. 817 (i913); Frazier v. Southern Trust etc. Co. (C. C. A., 4th Cir.,
I o).

"Hellman v. Goldstone, 161 Fed. 913 (C. C. A., 3rd Cir., 19o8).

NOTES

The recognition of the finality of the state court's decision,
when that touches matters of proof of claim or of discharge in bankruptcy, has, however, not gone unchallenged. The Bankruptcy Act ",
defining debts which may be proved, does not include all money
obligations and liabilities of the bankrupt. It is apparently settled
13
that arrears of alimony,' 2 damages granted for seduction, damages

for malicious libel, 14 sums decreed for the support of illegitimate
children, 15 fines imposed upon conviction for crime,'8 and statutory
penalties for torts,'1 7 are neither provable nor discharged. Now it
is fundamental that the rendition of a judgment, although it merges
the cause of action, does not affect the nature of the original liability.' 8 It is therefore essential that the court of bankruptcy look
beneath the judgment for the foundation on which it rests in order
to see whether it was decreed for any debt or liability that would
be provable.' 9 In so doing the bankruptcy court does not violate the
principles of res judicata; for, in the first place, the state court
adjudicated merely the question whether or not the one party before
it was indebted to the other party and did not pass upon the question as to whether the liability asserted was one recognized by the
Bankruptcy Act; and, in the second place, by Clause Two, the court
of bankruptcy is intrusted with the determination of the latter question itself."
But when a judgment is attacked, as a proof of claim, not upon
the nature of the original liability, but upon the bona fides or actuality of the claim itself, we find that there is but little authority in
the cases for the right of the bankruptcy court to go behind the
judgment. The doctrine of res judicata is applied unquestioningly:.
has not the state court determined that the bankrupt owed the claimant so much? However, under Bankruptcy Act of 1867, a court of
bankruptcy asserted a right to examine the judgment not only for
1§63.
Audubon v. Shufeldt, I8I U. S. 575 (Igoo); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196
U. S. 68 (19o4); Turner v. Turner, io8 Fed. 785 (1901); In re Lachemeyer,
Fed. Cas. No. 7,966 (1878).
"In re Cotton, Fed. Cas. No. 3269 (1843); in re Maples, O5 Fed. 99
(901).
"'Thompson v. Judy, 269 Fed. 553 (C. C. A., 6th Cir., I909).
"In re Cotten, Fed. Cas. No. 3, 269 (1843).
"IIn re Moore, iii Fed. 145 (191o); contra, In re Aldersen, 98 Fed. 588
12

(i8g).

"'In re Southern Steel Co., 183 Fed. 498 (igio).
I Wetmere v. Markoe, i96 U. S. 68, 4 (i9o4) ; Thompson v. Judy, supra;
Boynton v. Ball, 121 U. S. 457, 466 (887).
"Wetmore v. Markoe, supra; In re Cotton, supra; Thompson v. Judy,
supra; Turner v. Turner, supra; Knott v. Putnam, 107 Fed. 907 (i9oI).
See Loveland Bankruptcy (4th Ed.), 613.
"Knott v. Putnam, supra.
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fraud but also for irregularity. 21 Another bankruptcy court allowed
a claim only of the amount which it found was actually owed by the
bankrupt and not of the full amount of the judgment rendered by
the state court.2 2 And in one case under Act of 1898, a Circuit Court
of Appeals has upheld the right of the court of bankruptcy to review
a judgment which had been affirmed by the highest court of a state
by "placing itself in the substantial position of a court in equity
23
It
asked to enforce the decree of another court sitting in equity.
is submitted that this position is correct. For the final allowance of
a claim establishes the claimant's right to participate; the allowance
or disallowance of claims is, by the term of the Bankruptcy Act, a
matter for the bankruptcy court; and the spirit, if not the letter, of
the act requires the recognition of actual, bona fide debts and liabilities only. The determination of who are creditors, entitled to
participate, is a question of fact for the bankruptcy court alone; it
may accept the findings of the state court as its own, but the prior
adjudication by the state court cannot be held to have ousted the
bankruptcy court of its right, or relieved it of its duty, to inquire
into the foundation of the claim asserted, if it be assailed.
The English Bankruptcy Act seeks to procure the same definite
ends as our own. But in England the courts of bankruptcy have
an acknowledged right "to go behind" a judgment, even though it
has been affirmed by the court of appeals. 2' The judgment is prima
E3x parte O'Neil, Fed. Cas. No. 10,527, I Lowell 163 (1867).

See

Collier Bankruptcy, §63, III, C. (2) p. 707 (7th Ed.).
"Fowler v. Dillon, Fed. Cas. No. 50oo (1875), affirmed, per note at end
of case, by C. C. A., 4th Cir.
2Hobbs v. Head & Dowst Co., 184 Fed. 4o9 (C. C. A., ist Cir., 1911).
Cf., In re Wentachee-Stratford Co., 2o5 Fed. 964 (1913), where bankruptcy
court held a judgment obtained in a state court, under peculiar circumstances, to be presumptively fraudulent. Cf., New River Coal Land Co. v.
Ruffner Bros., i65 Fed. 881 (C. C. A., 4th Cir., i9o8), where on application
in bankruptcy court for stay of proceedings looking to the establishment of
a preference in state court, it was held that the prior denial by the state
court of a petition to stay the proceedings because of the adjudication in
bankruptcy of one of the parties, was not final or binding upon the bankruptcy court, because "the prime object of the B. A. is to secure an equal

distribution of the bankrupt's estate among his creditors." It is submitted
that this is already correct; the question was one within the peculiar jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court from which it could not be ousted by any
prior adjudication by any other tribunal. Yet the denial of the petition by
the state court, in the first place, was clearly "a judicial act" within the
Co., 2o2 Fed. 326
Benwoodin Brew
doctrine of res judicata. See In reReferee,
e Phelps, 3 Am. B. R.
I
(1913).

Cf., Opinion by Hotchkiss,

434 (i9oo), wherein of court of bankruptcy to re-examine facts upon which
the judgment of a statement was rendered, is asserted.

2"Exv parte Kibble, L. R. TO Ch. 373 (Eng. 1875); Ex parte Revell, 13
72o (Eng. 1884) ; Ex Parte Anderson, 14 Q. B. D. 6o6 (Eng. i885) ;
Ex parte Lennox, 16 Q. B. D. 315 (Eng. i885) ; In re Fraser (Eng. 1892), 2
Q. B. 633; In re Hawkins (Eng. i895), 1 Q. B. 404.

Q. B. D.

NOTES

facie evidence of a debt; but prima facie only.25 It can be attacked,
when offered as proof of debt in bankruptcy, upon the ground that
it is fraudulent, collusive, unreasonable, 26 unfair or merely erroneous.2 7

And if any facts are shown to the court which lead to a sus-

picion that the judgment was obtained upon a technicality without
any foundation in actual or legal liability, the burden is at once cast
upon the claimant to prove his claim as any simple debt must be
be proved.28 Having no appellate powers over the proceedings of
the court which has rendered the judgment, the allowance or disallowance of the claim founded on the judgment in no way affects
the existence or binding effect of the judgment itself.29 In

refus-

ing proof the bankruptcy court is acting on behalf of the true creditors.
P.N.S.
EVIDENCE-PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF PLAINTIFF-AS the

amount of litigation in tort claims for damages -for injury to the person increases, the question as to whether the court, on application of
the defendant, and in advance of trial, has the legal right to order
the plaintiff, without his or her consent, to submit to a surgical
examination as to the extent of the injury sued for, becomes more
practical and more important, especially in view of the fraudulent
character of many such claims. The question arose recently in
Atchison Ry. Co. v. Melson, and was answered in the negative.
The question has been a much-mooted one; but in the majority
of jurisdictions, it has been resolved in the affirmative.
Research has failed to discover an instance at common law
where, in a civil suit for personal injuries, the court, at the instance
of the defendant, ordered a physical examination of the plaintiff.
This failure is made much of by courts which refuse to order such
an examination. The courts which uphold the power reach their
conclusion solely by reasoning from analogy. The cases in which
a similar power was exercised at common law were those involving
the infancy or identity of a party; also in appeals of mayhem. In
determining questions of impotence as affecting the validity of a
marriage, courts of divorce might order an inspection by surgeons
of the person of either party. A similar inspection might also be
under notes 16 and 21, supra.
In re Hawkins, supra. "Although the judgment is apparently founded
upon the compromise of a doubtful claim, yet it is clearly an unreasonable,
foolish and absurd compromise such as should not bind all of Hawkins'
creditors," per Lord Ecker, M. R.
" Ex parte Kibble, supra.
'Ex parte Anderson, supra.
"Ex parte Lennox, supra.
1 134 Pac. Rep. 389 (Okl. 1913).
25Cases
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made where a woman, convicted of capital crime, was alleged to be
quick with child, it being purposed to avoid the possibility of taking
the life of an unborn child for the crime of its mother. In other
cases, as mentioned by Coke, 2 '"when a man having lands in fee dieth,
and his wife soon after marrieth againe, and faimes herself with
child by her former husband, the writ de ventre inspeciendo doth
lie for the heire," the purpose being to protect the proper succession
to the property of a decedent. The power of courts to subject parties to physical examination in suits for injury to the person, is
simply an extension and application of these principles which have
been long recognized. Analogy is also drawn from the power which
courts of equity have long exercised of compelling a party to produce books, papers and documents in his possession or control and
constituting evidence, material to a cause, for inspection by his adversary. The courts have disagreed as to whether the extension is
legitimate, but the division of opinion is an unequal one. The weight
of authority is clearly in favor of the power.
3
In the leading case of Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, the
Supreme Court of United States, speaking through Mr. Justice
Gray, said: "No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully
guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint
and interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable
authority of law.

. .

.

The inviolability of the person is as

much invaded by a compulsory stripping and exposure as by a
blow." The respect which is ordinarily due a decision by that
learned tribunal is, in this case, 4 much discounted by the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer, the reasoning of which is very cogent
and forcible. He says: "The silence of common law authorities
upon the question in cases of this kind proves little or nothing. The
number of actions to recover damages in early days, was, compared
with later times, limited. . . . The end of litigation is justice.
Knowledge of the truth is essential thereto. . . . It is said there

is a sanctity of the person which may not be outraged. We believe
that truth and justice are more sacred than any personal consideration." And, with like reasoning, Mr. Justice Mitchell said: 1 "Any
other rule in these personal injury cases, would often result in an
entire denial of justice to the defendant, and leave him wholly at
the mercy of the plaintiff's witnesses. In very many cases, the
actual nature and extent of the injuries can only be ascertained by
a physical examination of the person of the injured party. Such
actions were formerly very infrequent, but of late years they constitute one of the largest branches of legal industry, and are not
' Co. Litt 8b.
U. S. 250 (I890).
'Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, n. 3 .saupra.
'Wanek v. Wenona, 78 Minn. 98 (1899).
SI41

NOTES

infrequently attempted to be sustained by malingering on the part
of the plaintiff, false testimony, or the very unreliable speculations
of so called 'medical experts.'" Following such reasoning, the great
majority of our courts recognize the -power of trial courts, in the
absence of conferring statutes, to require plaintiffs, in actions for
personal injuries, to submit themselves to surgical examination in
respect thereto.6 The harmony of courts upon the subject is broken
by the dissent of Montana, 7 Oklahoma,8 and the United States
courts,' and possibly Indiana 10 and Illinois."
In Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, supra, Mr. Justice Gray
refers to the writ de ventre inspeciendo as an "ancient practice coming down from ruder ages." But the significance of the writ de
ventre is this, that in an epoch and a country where landed rights
were a paramount and constant concern in litigation, the courts were
not deterred by a false delicacy from taking such measures as common sense required for determining the truth. Therefore, in our
modern community, where the various mechanical applications of
natural force have added a thousand dangers to life and limb, and
where actions for personal injuries now fill the prominent place
once occupied by formedon in reverter and ejecto firmae, the same
common sense should be invoked to apply the same expedients amid
our changed conditions. There is the added consideration that corporal injuries are today notoriously a subject of frequent fraud and
misrepresentation. 12 The argument that it involves a violation of
the right to personal liberty and privacy, that its application to sensibilities of refined and delicate women will be shocked and their dignity trespassed upon, has little force, and is based upon considerations which are purely sentimental. Much may safely be intrusted
to the discretion of the courts, and in their hands these rights and
sensibilities will be properly safeguarded, and will yet, as they should,
be subordinate in importance and sacredness to the interests of
justice.
Y.L.S.
'King v.State, ioo Ala. 85 (1893) ; St Louis R. R. Co. v. Dobbins, 6o
Ark. 481 (895); Richmond Ry. Co. v. Childress, 82 Ga. 719 (1889) ; Schroeder v. Chicago R. R. Co., 47 Iowa 375 (1877); Ottawa v. Gilliland, 63 Kan.
165 (i9oi); Belt Co. v. Allen, 102 Ky. 55' (1898); Graves v. Battle Creek,
95 Mich. 266 01893); Wanek v. Wenona, 78 Minn. 98 (1899); Brown v.
Chicago R. R. Co., 95 N. W. Rep. 153 (N. Dak. 19o3); Miami & Co. v.
Bailey, 37 Oh. St. 104 (1881) ; Hess v. R. R. Co., Pa. C. C. 565 (1882); Lane
v. R. R. Co. 21 Wash. iig (1899); White v. M. Ry. Co., 61 Wis. 536 (1884).
'May v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 32 Mont. 522 (19o).
'City v. Altizer, 13 Okl. 121 (1903).
'Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Votsford, n. 3, supra.
"Pa. Co. v. Newmeyer, 129 Ind. 4o (i8gi).
"St. Louis Bridge Co. v. Miller, 138 Ill. 465 (1891).
" See, Wigmore, Evidence §2220.
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INSURANCE-PROHIBITED ARTICLES-SUSPENSION AND REVIVAL OF PoLIcY-The rule that the insured must strictly comply

with the terms of the warranties of his contract of insurance had
its rise and formulation in the law of marine insurance at a time
when the contract was comparatively simple, and when the underwriter was largely at the mercy of the insured in determining the
nature, quality, and degree of the risk. This rule was transplanted
in its entirety into the early English common law, and descended as
an inheritance not altogether deserved, to the life and fire insurers
whose policies are drawn less favorably to the insured than the
usual marine policy, and who, by vast economic, commercial and
legal experience stand in a far more advantageous position with
regard to the comprehension and interpretation of the contract than
the insured generally.' The warranties customarily found in an
insurance contract have been divided by some courts and writers
into (i) affirmative warranties, i. e., those conditions which were to
be performed or to exist precedent to the consummation of the contract, and (2) promissory warranties, or those conditions the performance or existence of which was to be subsequent to the consummation of the contract, but precedent to the attaching of the
risk. It is doubtful whether this distinction has any merit other
than convenience of classification, since the real question turns
2
always on the construction and effect of the warranty as such.
The cases to be considered form one group under the so-called
promissory warranties, viz, those cases adjudicating upon the effect
of the violation of a condition or warranty in a policy of fire insurance, where that violation was either temporary or at least had
ceased prior to the loss, and was in no wise contributory thereto.
Many of the courts have applied the strict general rule mentioned
above, and ruled that the violation worked an absolute forfeiture
of the policy,3 and that it was immaterial whether the breach did or
did not affect or contribute to the loss,4 or whether the prohibited
act had ceased or not ;5 and that there could be no revival of the
contract without the consent of both parties, or without a waiver
by the insurer.
Mr. Justice Elkin, speaking for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, has recently considered the question and endorsed and
'Richards, Insurance Law (3rd Ed.),
22oo et seq.
sRichards, Ins. Law, §§io7, iog, 114.
"Williams

v. Ins. Co., 57 N. Y.

277

151;

Joyce, Treatise on Ins., 1777,

(1874) ; Wheeler v. Ins. Co.,

62

N. H.

450 (1883).
"Turnbull v. Ins. Co., 83 Md. 312 (1896); Glen v. Lewis, 8 Exch. 607
(Eng. 1853); Mead v. Ins. Co., 7 N. Y. 530. (i852).
'Mead v. Ins. Co., supra, n. 4; Wainer v. Ins. Co., 153 Mass. 339 (i89i).
'Mead v. N. W. Ins. Co., supra n. 4; and cases cited above.

NOTES

applied the contrary rule;7 and in so doing has placed the court in
accord with the weight of authority and the more equitable rule.
A store building had been covered by insurance for a period of
eighteen years by a policy which contained a provision against the
keeping of gasoline, illuminating oil, and gunpowder on the premises. A tenant, in the conduct of a general store business, had carried these prohibited articles as a part of his stock, until two years
prior to the fire, at which time another business was installed. The
question turned squarely upon whether this breach could now be
declared to have worked a forfeiture, or a suspension merely, during the breach, and it was ruled "that the sounder and more equitable
rule is against absolute forfeiture and in favor of the doctrine that
the policy although suspended during the time the prohibited articles are kept on the premises may be revived by a discontinuance
of the keeping or use of such prohibited articles."" A reargument
had been ordered in this case "for the purpose of giving a hearing
before the full bench in order that the proper rule in this class of
cases should be finally settled," and after declaring the above rule,
the court added: "We deem it wise to settle as far as possible this
much mooted question by adopting the rule of the reasonable enforcement of contracts of insurance rather than to declare a forfeiture thereof, if this can be done without doing violence to the
intention of the contracting parties."
It is suggested that the decision, in view of the breadth of statement and the authorities relied on,9 is intended to cover not only
prohibited articles but the entire class of "promissory" warranties,
the breach of which had ceased before and was in no wise contributory to the loss, and during the continuance of which no forfeiture had been claimed by the insurer. If such is to be the
application of "the rule of reasonable enforcement," the decisions
'McClure v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co. of Chester County, 242 Pa. 59 (1913).
lIn N. B. M. I. Co. v. Union Stock Yards Co., 27 Ky. Law Rep. 852
(9o5), the rule was stated: "The right of the matter seems to us to be
that, while the forbidden condition is permitted by the assured to exist, the
contract will be suspended. If the loss then occurs the insurer will not be
liable. But, if before the loss and during the term covered by the policy,
the original condition is restored, the liability of the insurer is also. This
gives the assured all that he bargained for. It exacts nothing from the
insurer beyond what it has assumed and taken pay for. Consequently the
use of the leased premises for even forbidden purposes, but which had been
discontinued long before the fire, was not an obstacle to the right of the
insured to recover upon the policy. Strict forfeitures are repugnant to the
law." See also Joyce, "Treatise on Insurance," §§2239, et seq.
'Inter alia citing Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 81 Am. Dec. 521 (Ky. 1862);
Ins. Co. v. Union Stock Yards Co., 27 Ky. Law Rep. 852 (9o5); Williams
v. Ins. Co., 31 Me. 219 (1850); Port Blak. Mill Co. v. Ins. Co., IIO Pac.
Rep. 36 (Wash. igio); Ins. Co. v. Coatesville Shoe Factory, 8o Pa. 407
(1876); Mears v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 92 Pa. 15 (1879); Traders Ins. Co. v.
Catlin, 163 Ill. 256 (1896).
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of this court will have the unquestioned merit of harmony of principle, and equity and consistency of application. The value of such
uniform application of the rile is seen to be inestimable when it is
observed that there is an apparently hopeless discord existing in
several instances in the rulings of the same jurisdiction," as well
as in those of different jurisdictions in declaring whether the breach
constituted an absolute forfeiture or a suspension, often stating the
rule arbitrarily or basing it upon dicta of earlier cases. The most
frequent instances in which the question is presented are under12
prohibitive warranties against increase of risk,"' transfer of title,
vacancy, 13 hazardous articles,'1 4 and other insurance.' 5 The -decision
in McClure v. Mutual Fire Insurance Company,'8 seems to have
unified the rulings.
J.C.A.
MINES-NATuRAL UsE-LIMITATION OF THE SANDERSON CASE

-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has once more considered,
distinguished and limited the authority of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Sanderson.' In this recent 2 case the plaintiff and the defendant
owned adjoining properties; the latter a large tract of coal land, the
former a farm. For many years the defendant had been mining
and removing coal on its land; and prior to 19o8 the mine water collected and pumped to the surface, was discharged into a different
water shed than that in which the plaintiff's farm was situated.
" For instance, two Ohio decisions handed down the same day, Ohio
Far. Ins. Co. v. Burget, 65 Ohio St. 119 (Igoi) declaring a suspension in
case of a temporary transfer of goods; and Ohio F. I. Co. v. Waters, 65
Ohio St. 157 (19Ol) declaring a transfer of title worked a forfeiture, even
though at the time of the loss the insured was again owner.
I Forfeiture declared in Kyte v. Ins. Co., 149 Mass. z16 (1889); Suspension merely, Trad. Ins. Co. v. Catlin, 163 Ill. 256 (1896); N. B. M. I.
Co. v. Union S. Y. Co., supra, n. 9.
" Suspension: Schloss v. Ins. Co., 141 Ala. 566 (1904); Worthington
v. Bearse, 94 Mass. 3829 (1866). Forfeiture: Bemis v. Ins. Co., 2oo Pa. 340
(igoi); Ins. Co. v. Waters, supra, n. 1O.
ISuspension: Ins. Co. v. Garland, 1o8 I1. 220 (1884); Ring v. Ins. Co.,
145 Mass. 426 (i888). Forfeiture: Moore v. Ins. Co., 62 N. H. 24o (1882);
Wainer v. Ins. Co., supra, n. 5; Kentucky, etc., Co. v. Ins. Co., 146 Fed. Rep.
695 (C. C. 19o6).
", Suspension: Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Lawrence, 4 Met. 9 (Ky. 1862);
Williams v. Ins. Co., supra, n. 9. Forfeiture: Mead v. Ins. Co.; Turnbull v.
Ins. Co., Yupra, n. 4.
'Suspension:

Ins. Co. v. Klewer, 129 Ill. 5o9 (1889);

Obermeyer v.

Forfeiture: Replogle v. Ins. Co., 132 Ind.
Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 573 (869).
360 (1892); Ins. Co. v. Rosenfeld, 37 C. C. A. 96 (1899).
"N. 7, supra.
1113 Pa. 126 (i886).
'McCune

v. Pittsburg & B. C. Co., 238 Pa. 83 (1913).

NOTES

After 19o8, however, the water thus discharged to the surface
flowed naturally into a tributary of the stream which ran through
farm; and, as a consequence, the stream was rendered useless for
domestic or farm purposes. A bill for an injunction was granted
against the defendant, who was allowed six months to enable it to
arrange for some other disposition of the water. The opinion of
the lower court was affirmed in a per curiam decision of the Supreme Court.
In granting the bill, Doty, P. J., said :3 "Unless this case be
clearly an exception, the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedam . . . must apply and control. And this principle, as
all the authorities declare, always applies whenever in the use of
one's own property any substantial and avoidable injury is done to
the property of another." He then proceeds to distinguish Sanderson's case which, he states, holds that 4 "an owner of coal lands
can mine his coal in the usual and ordinary way; and in such operation allow the water as it comes from the mine to flow naturally
into a stream of pure water without liability to a lower riparian
owner for the pollution of the stream; and such operator can in a
shaft operation pump mine water to the surface and allow it to seek
its natural outlet, without liability for damage if the water of the
stream be already polluted." He further states that Sanderson's
case, as a result of the modifications and qualifications of it by later
cases, is, at most, an authority only on its exact facts.
The rule of Sanderson's case was decided by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court after the case had been before the court for the
fourth time; and on that occasion, all the previous decisions concerning the case were overruled. In that case the plaintiff in the
coal lands, on which he erected a handsome residence and made
valuable improvements in order that he might be supplied with water
for culinary, bathing and other purposes from a stream of pure
water which flowed through his land. Shortly afterwards the defendant opened a mine on the stream about two miles above the
plaintiff's land. The water, pumped therefrom in the operation of
the mine, flowed naturally into the stream, and so polluted it as to
render the water unfit for the uses to which it had been adapted. In
a suit for damages the plaintiff was nonsuited at the first trial. On
appeal, 5 the Supreme Court held that the case should have been
submitted to the jury; and Woodward, J., in delivering the opinion
of the court said, 6 "Undoubtedly the defendants were engaged in a
perfectly law-ful business, in which large expenditures had been
made, and with which widespread interests were connected. But,
3

At p. 90.
'At p. 9'.
'86 Pa. 4O (I878).
'At p. 405.
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however laudable an industry may be, its managers are still subject
to the rule that their property cannot be so used as to inflict injury
on the property of their neighbors."
At the second trial there was a verdict for the plaintiff. But
both litigants took writs of error from the rulings of the trial
judge. In the two arguments thereon before the court,7 it affirmed
its previous decision and ruled in favor of the plaintiff in his appeal,
ordering a new trial. At the third trial, a larger verdict for the
plaintiff was returned, and defendant appealed. On this fourth
appeal,s the Supreme Court overruled its three previous decisions
as to the plaintiff's cause of action and laid down the rule which has
been so much criticized. In this decision, Clark, J., delivered the
opinion of the court, from which three of the seven judges dissented. He said, inter alia,9 "It may be stated as a general proposition that every man has the right to the natural use and enjoyment
of his own property; and if, while lawfully in such use and enjoyment, without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable loss
occurs to his neighbor, it is damnum absque injuria; for the rightful
use of one's own land may cause damage to another, without any
legal wrong.

.

.

.

It will be observed that the defendants have

done nothing to change the character of the water, or to diminish
its purity, save what results from the natural use and enjoyment of
their own property. They have brought nothing upon the land
artificially.10

.

.

.

In the first place, then, we do not regard the

rule in Rylands v. Fletcher as having any application to a case of
this kind; and if it had, we are unwilling to recognize the arbitrary
and absolute rule of responsibility it declares, to the full extent, at
least, to which its general statement would necessarily lead."" The
opinion also laid great stress on the fact that great industrial interests would be affected by any other decision than that given; and
also noted that there was evidence that the stream might have been
polluted from other causes, and, accordingly, there should be no
liability.
This final judgment, decided by a divided court, must be taken
to have gone to the extreme of considering the term "natural use"
to mean "any act tending to the most profitable use of the land."'12
It was not very long, therefore, before the case began to be discussed, distinguished and modified in later cases, until its authority
was finally limited to the exact facts involved.
Three years after its decision, the Supreme Court, in -discussing
it, stated's that "the use which inflicts the damage must be natural,
'94 Pa. 302 (i88o) ;
@113 Pa. 126 (1886).

102

Pa. 370 (1883).

'At p. 146.
"At p. 145.

"At p. 154.
"Vide Prof. Bohlen's article "The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher," 59
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proper and free from negligence, and the damage unavoidable."
Robb v. Carnegie,14 was distinguished from it on the ground that
in the Sanderson case the use of the land by the Coal Company was
the only practical one; and if it had been denied this use because of
some unavoidable injury to others "the result would be practical
confiscation of the coal lands for the benefit of householders, living
in lower lands"; whereas in Robb v. Carnegie, 5 the defendants
were not developing the minerals of their own land, but were using
it in manufacturing coal mined from other land.
The tendency to limit the case to its own facts continued
through all subsequent cases. In Hindson v. Markle,6 Sanderson's
case was distinguished as being a case in which "the mere flowage
of natural water which was discharged by natural and irresistible
forces, necessarily developed in the act of mining prosecuted in a
perfectly lawful manner. While the mine water thus discharged
polluted the water of the stream in which it necessarily flowed it
caused no deposit of any foreign substance on the land of the plaintiff and did not deprive her of its use"' 7 as was the case in Hindson
v. Markle. The court in this way found the distinction which it
sought and was thus able to decide the case without overruling the
Sanderson case. That the celebrated case does not control when
public rights are involved is intimated in some decisions: "Does a
great municipality stand on the same ground, when the water supply
for its multitude of people is under consideration, as a single prop'
erty owner must stand under Sanderson's case ?"18
373, 423; note 71 at p. 380.
"Collins v. Charters Co., 131 Pa. 143 (1889), at p. 157; B bored for
gas and an injury resulted to A's neighboring water-well, arising from the
commingling by B's well, of the salt and fresh waters percolating under
ground. Held: B liable; the injury could be anticipated and was preventable by the exercise of reasonable care at a reasonable cost. Followed in
Pfeiffer v. Brown, 165 Pa. 267 (895).
14 145 Pa. 338 (i89I), B was engaged in manufacturing coke from coal
not mined by himself but purchased at the mines of others, remote from
his land. Held: B liable for substantial injuries to the crops and soil of
A's adjoning farm, caused by the smoke and vapors emitted from B's ovens
as necessary incident thereto. Accord: Hauck v. Line Co., 153 Pa. 366
(1893); Welliver v. Irondale Co., 38 Super. Ct. 26 (igog).
"Supra, n. 14.
S6171 Pa. 138 (i895), B, the owner of coal mines, deposited the refuse
and culm on his own land but in a position where ordinary storms could
wash it into the stream; damage resulted to A, a lower owner. Held: B
liable. Accord: Elder v. Coal Co., 157 Pa. 49o (1893) senble.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, 298,

TAt pp. 144, 145.

'Com.

v. Russel, 172 Pa. 5o6 (1896); Com. v. Emmers, 221 Pa. 298
(I9o8); 33 Super. Ct. i5i (igog). The A. Co., a private corporation supply a
city with water, brought bill for an injunction against B for polluting its
supply of water resulting from B's pumping salt water therein from his
wells. Lower court held that Sanderson's case ruled, this was reversed
and the case sent back for trial. Vide 172 Pa. 519, 520, 52r.
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9
suggested that the decision of the
The court in one case
as to apply it under all circummodified,
be
should
case
Sanderson
stances would result in a practical confiscation of the lower proprietor for the benefit of the upper; but it refuses to do so on the
ground that the case which it is deciding does 20not necessitate any
it is said, "The
consideration of that case. In another case,
changed conditions brought about by the appellee have not resulted
its own
from the development and natural use and enjoyment of
21.
property, as was the case in Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, the doctrine of which case has never been and never ought to be extended
beyond the limitations put upon it by its own facts." Somewhat to
22
in its statement, "This case
the same effect is the Superior Court
(Sanderson's case) is exceptional and rests entirely upon its own
which rendered it,
facts, and has been distinguished by the court
23
Markle."'
v.
Hindson
in
this
as
such
cases
from
Not only have the later Pennsylvania cases thus taken away all
authority from the Sanderson case beyond its own facts, but the
courts of other States have criticized it and considered it to be weak
24
It can, therefore, be said
as an authority even on its exact facts.
with this most recent expression of our Supreme Court, that the
decision no longer states any peculiar Pennsylvania rule as was inti-

mated in an English case.25

N. I.S. G.

NEGLIGENCE-UNREGISTERED AUTOMOBILE ON A HIGHWAY-In
a recent Massachusetts case 1 the plaintiff, whose automobile was
damaged by collision with defendant's on a public highway, was
not permitted to recover, since he was operating his automobile in
violation of a statute prohibitfiig the operation of unregistered
automobiles.
This decision simply follows the rule already stablished in
that State, the courts of which have uniformly assumed that the
plaintiff's unlawful act contributed to his injury; while on the other
hand, the courts of New York and some other States have just as
consistently held that the plaintiff in such cases may recover, always
"Robertson v. Coal Co., 172 Pa. 566 (896).
Sullivan v. Steel Co., 2o8 Pa. 54o (I9O4), at p. 549.
SSupra, n. i.
"Bricker v. Stone Co., 32 Super. Ct. 283 (19o6). Residuum of
quarrying and stone-crushing operations, cast into a stream on which
works were situated, caused sediment to settle on A's lower mill dam
damaged A's mill. Held: B liable.
" Supra, n. 16.
"Straight v. Hover, 79 Ohio 263 (i9o9); Parker v. Woolen Co.,
Mass. 591 (i9o7).
3Young v. Distilling Co. (Eng. i893), A. C. 6gi.
'Holden v. McGillicuddy, io2 N. E. Rep. g23 (Mass. 1913).
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giving as among the controlling reasons that the illegal act did not
contribute to the injury. Since such opposite results have been
reached while proceeding upon the same premises, there must be a
fallacy somewhere in the reasoning. It seems to be in the Massachusetts rule, in the assumption that a mere concurrence of the
illegal act with the accident in point of time is to be treated as a
concurring cause of the injury, which it is not, but rather merely a
condition or incident.2 This distinction is clearly brought out in
cases where the violation of the Sunday law has been urged as a
defence to actions for personal injuries. The rule established by
preponderance of authority and the trend of later decisions is, that
it is not a defence, for such violation is not the efficient or proximate cause of the injury nor is it an essential element of the cause
of action, the time of the injury not being the foundation of the
action, but only an incident to the efficient cause of the injury.3
Lord Mansfield is quoted 4 as saying: "Ex dolo malo non oritur actio"
-no court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action
upon an immoral or illegal act. In such a case as the one in question the plaintiff does not base his cause of action upon his illegal
act, but upon an injury caused by the negligent act of another. It
is true plaintiff's illegal act was an incident or condition existing
at the time, but it did not contribute directly to his injury.
It is argued in the cases not allowing recovery that such person, if he had hot been so traveling or laboring in violation of the
law, would not have received the injury, and he therefore contributes to the injury by such act. The validity of this reasoning depends on the validity of the assumption that the acts constituting the
violation of the statute are a contributory or concurring cause of the
injury.' The text-writers seem to be agreed, it is true, that the
general rule is that, if the person injured was at the time he received
the injury doing some act in violation of a statute or ordinance, he
cannot recover, if such violation contributed to his injury. But
before the illegal act or omission can be held contributory negligence, it must appear that such act or omission was a proximate
cause of the injury. The mere collateral wrong-doing of the plaintiff should not, of itself, defeat his recovery, unless it has some
causal connection with it and is in some way a concurrent cause of
the accident."
'Tackett v. Taylor Ca., 123 Iowa 149 (I9o4); Magar v. Hammond, 54

N. Y. App. Div. 532 (1900).

'See note to Hughes v. Atlantic Steel Co., 36 L. R. A. (N. S.) 547.
'Roller v. Murray, 112 Va. 780, 783 (1911).
'Baldwin v. Barney, 12 R. I. 392 (1879).
' Cooley's Torts (3d Ed.) Vol. I, p. 274; Shearman & Redfield's Neglimust have been such as to have caused, or helped to cause the injury
gence (5th Ed.) Vol. i, §1o4.
"Beach's

Contributory Neg., §47; Hoffmfan v. Union Ferry Co., 68 N. Y.
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To make good the defence it must appear that a relation existed
between the act or violation of law on the part of the plaintiff, and
the injury or accident of which he complains. And that relation
or accident, not in any remote or speculative sense, but in the natural and ordinary course of events, as one event is known to precede
or follow another." The ingenuous argument advanced, where
plaintiff was exceeding speed limit, that inasmuch as it was the
excessive speed which brought the car to the place of the accident
at the moment of the accident, that speed was the immediate cause
of the plaintiff's injury, is somewhat sophistical. It was the merest
chance and a thing which no foresight could have predicted.,
In Massachusetts the operation of the unregistered automobile
is deemed to be unlawful in every feature and aspect of it. In using
the highway the machine is an outlaw. The operator is guilty of
conduct which is permeated in every part by his disobedience of the
law and which directly contributes to the injury10 In Dudley v.
Northampton Street R. Co.," it was said that if the plaintiff simply
was driving his vehicle on a public way in a manner forbidden by
law or without appliances required by law and received injuries
which resulted solely from the negligence of another, he should
not be barred of recovery by the mere fact of his own violation of
the law. But where the statute expressly provides that no automobile shall be operated upon any public highway unless registered,
that shows, the court said, that the legislation intended to outlaw
them, and to give them as to persons lawfully using the highway, no
other rights than that of being exempt from reckless, wanton, or
wilful injury.
12
The same distinction was recognized in a Connecticut case,'
where the statute imposed an obligation upon plaintiff to register his
automobile and for its violation prescribed a penalty, but contained
no prohibition against using an unregistered machine upon the highways. The court held that the plaintiff's right of action is not taken
away because at the time his injuries were sustained, he was disobeying a statute law, which in no way contributed to the accident.
That this distinction is not sound it shown by Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Weir,18 where the court, in dealing with a statute similar
385 (1877); Lockbridge v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. R. Co., 14o N. W. Rep.
(Ia. 1913).

' Sutton v. Town of Wauwatosa, 29 Wis. 21 (1871).
'Berry v. Sugar Notch Borough, 191 Pa. 345 (1899).
"Chase v. N. Y., etc., R. Co., 2o8 Mass. 137 (1911);
quoted and rule reaffirmed in Bourne v. Whitman, 209
In Feley v. City of Melrose, 205 Mass. 329 (igio), it
passengers riding in such a car were trespassers, even
not aware of the fact that the car was unregistered.
'12o2 Mass. 443 (igog).
'Hemming v. New Haven, 74 Atl. Rep. 892 (Conn.
'58 So. Rep. 641 (Fla. 1912).

this language was
Mass. 155 (911).
was held that the
though they were
igio).
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to the one in our principal case, said that since it did not expressly
or impliedly provide that there shall be no recovery for a negligent
injury to an unlicensed motor vehicle being operated on the public
highway, a recovery may be had under the principles of common
law. In doing an unlawful act a person is not denied the rights
and protection accorded by14the law; he is never thrown by the law
upon the mercy of others.

However, the court in the last-mentioned case said the license
feature of the statute was a revenue measure only, since there was
no provision for examination to test the vehicles' efficiency. On the
other hand, the Massachusetts statute contains such provisions manifestly intended as precautions to be observed for the safety of other
persons upon the highway, and, perhaps, upon this ground the results there reached may be justified.
The New York court 15 sets forth that the Sunday law exhausts
itself in the penalty prescribed, and that to give it further effect by
forfeiting the plaintiff's right of action would be in effect adding to
the penalty. To a certain extent this is true, namely, where the
plaintiff has not contributed to his injury. It is only upon the assumption that the plaintiff's illegal act does not contribute to his
injury that you can add to the penalty by denying a right of action
for the injury. Surely one must have a right of action before he
can forfeit it. He cannot lose what he never had in fact or in right.
Where his illegal act does contribute to his injury, he has no right of
action whatever, and by so holding nothing whatever is added to the
prescribed penalty. Probably it is for this reason the Massachusetts statute does not expressly provide that a right of action shall
be denied the violator thereof.
S.L.M.
"Cooley's Torts (3d Ed.), p. 273; In Ches., etc., R. Co. v. Jennings, 98
Va. 7o (igoo), it is said not to be contributory negligence per se for the
injured party at the time of the injury to be engaged in a violation of law.
Such violation does not put him out of the protection of the law, nor at the
mercy of others. But if such violation contributed to his injury, he cannot
recover therefor.
'

Platz v. City of Cohoes, 89 N. Y. 219 (1882).

